



Airborne Separation in Advanced En-Route ATM

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Presented to the AP-23 Working Group



Honeywell

Project Consortium

Honeywell

- ✦ **National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR)** 
- ✦ **Honeywell** 
- ✦ **Isdefe** 
- ✦ **University of Tartu** 
- ✦ **Athens University of Economics And Business** 
- ✦ **Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule Zurich** 
- ✦ **University of l'Aquila** 
- ✦ **Politecnico di Milano** 
- ✦ **University of Cambridge** 
- ✦ **National Technical University of Athens** 
- ✦ **University of Twente** 
- ✦ **Ecole National de l'Aviation Civile** 
- ✦ **Dedale** 
- ✦ **UK NATS En Route Ltd.** 
- ✦ **Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique** 
- ✦ **Eurocontrol EEC** 
- ✦ **DSNA-DTI-SDER** 
- ✦ **University of Leicester** 





Develop & Validate




Highly automated ATM design for en-route traffic based on autonomous aircraft concept.

Key design aspects:

- Human responsibilities
- Traffic Complexity
- Safety Assessment using SESAR compliant safety targets

Airborne Separation in Future ATM

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iFly's Scope:

- ✓ High Density Traffic
- ✓ Only Self Separation Capable Aircraft

Two Design Cycles To Answer Two Main Research Questions:



- ❖ Up to which en route traffic demands is (pure) Self Separation sufficiently safe? (A^3 design cycle)
- ❖ Which complementary support services from ground ATM are needed in order to accommodate higher traffic demands ? (A^4 design cycle)
 - ❖ A^4 = ATM-supported Autonomous Aircraft Advanced concept

iFly Project Structure

Autonomous aircraft
concept

- ✓ Free Flight
- ✓ AFAS
- ✓ Gate-to-Gate
- ✓ CARE-ASAS
- ✓ MFF
- ...

State-of-the-art

A3 Design Cycle

WP1

Assessment:

- Safety (WP7)
- Efficiency (WP7)
- Human factors (WP2)
- Capacity (WP7)
- Economy (WP6)



WP8

A4 Design Cycle

Air and Ground
Requirements

Advanced Operational
Concept

Safety Assessment (WP9)


Distributed Control and
Stochastic Analysis of
Hybrid System

HYBRIDGE
(2002-2005)

Complexity (WP3)

Situation Awareness (WP4)


Conflict Resolution (WP5)



A3 Design Cycle

- **iFLY ConOps Assumptions**


- **Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR) operations within Performance Based Airspace (PBA)**
- **Fully equipped Self Separation-capable aircraft considered only**
 - ♦ FMS, ASAS, ACAS, Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI), Communications Management Unit (CMU) able to communicate with SWIM and other aircraft via datalink (at least ADS-B In/Out).
- **En-route phase of flight**
- **Flight level structure not adhered to during AFR operations.**
- **Self Separation trajectories end at RTA in BT.**
- **No ATC ground support.**



AC Separation

- **Protected Airspace Zone (PAZ)**

- Legal separation requirement.
- Should not be penetrated to ensure safety
- Dynamic PAZ with two real-time changing zones
 - ◆ Aircraft – Aircraft Conflict Avoidance Zone (AACAZ)
 - ◆ Wake Vortex Encounter Avoidance Zone (WVEAZ)



- **Alert Zone (AZ)**


- When penetrated triggers an intervention by ATC.
- May represent resolution zone for conflict resolution.

- **Separation minima suitable for Autonomous Flight to be determined**


- RNP-1 capable AC enable reduction to 3NM
- Dynamic PAZ may include Aircraft Conflict Avoidance Zone (AACAZ) and Wake Vortex Encounter Avoidance Zone (WVEAZ)

- **Conflict situations: aircraft PAZ enters**

- A Restricted Airspace Area (RAA)
- A Weather Hazard Area (WHA)
- A Terrain/Obstacle restriction
- Another aircraft's PAZ.



Flow & Trajectory & Management




- **Strategic Flow Management provided to AC**
 1. Ensure traffic complexity and density within safety and capacity limits
 2. Provide Transition Operations between IFR and AFR
 3. Provide Support Services for aircraft to achieve adequate Situation Awareness.
 - Uplink RBT, meteo & hazard data, traffic congestion, special use airspace.
- **Trajectory Management**
 - Generates optimal path across PBA, incl. Strategic deconfliction
 - FMS best suited for integrated airborne trajectory management within AFR ops.
 - TM trajectory modifications should only affect flight > 20 minutes ahead, otherwise might interfere with ASAS actions.

Functional System Architecture


Areas information data set –
(weather, congested airspace, ...)

- Ground-air SWIM updates
- Onboard systems (Wx radar, EGPWS)




Trajectory Synthesizer

- Ensures that trajectory changes result into new consistent (complete) conflict free BT incl. AFR exit condition
- Inserts revised BT into FMS



- **Main Research Areas**

- Safety simulations (rare event modelling)
- Human factors
- Complexity metrics and prediction
- Situation awareness & modelling of complex hybrid systems
- Conflict resolution methods



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1. Hazard Identification

2. Safety Assessment – Rare event modelling based on the Hybridge project (TOPAZ)

Complex System Modelling – Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes represented by Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets

Air Traffic Simulation – Sequential Monte Carlo Methods

3. RTCA/Eurocae ED78a Safety Assessment

Two Essential Tasks:

✦ University of Tartu

- 1. Provide Input To Both Design Cycles**
- 2. Analyze and Identify Bottlenecks of Designed Systems and Propose Solutions**

Main Issues

- Analysis of pilots en-route tasks
- Cockpit crew responsibility analysis
- Pilot's workload studies
- Situation awareness maintenance
- Identification of bottlenecks



Three iFly teams address 3 CR strategies

- **Long Term CR** (one hour or beyond)
 - **Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zurich**
 - Both centralized (ground-based) and distributed methods
- **Mid Term CR** (tens of minutes)
 - **University of Cambridge**
 - Distributed methods, questions of suitable intent information
- **Short Term CR** (minutes)
 - **National Technical University of Athens**
 - Distributed methods, interface with TCAS

Main Issues

- Choice of suitable CR maneuvers
 - E.g., Geometrical CR algorithms well suited for implicit coordination.
- Coordination of CR maneuvers between conflicting aircraft
- TP uncertainty handling
- Conflict of multiple aircraft (clustering)
- Optimization (selection) criteria

Situation Awareness & Hybrid Systems

✦ University of l'Aquila

Two parallel approaches:

Conventional

Theoretical (formal)

Vs.

Based on the expert assessment and subsequently validated – used in both design cycles.

Based on complex hybrid system modelling and subsequent analysis of critical observability.



Some Questions of Interest

- WHAT ARE THE MOST SUITABLE CR ALGORITHM(S) FOR ASAS OPERATIONS?
- SHOULD CR MANOEUVRES BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY IN THE VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PLANES?
- SHOULD THE CR ALGORITHMS BE PART OF THE FMS, TCAS OR AN INDEPENDENT BOX?
- WHAT ARE THE CHANGES NECESSARY IN CURRENT AVIONIC SYSTEMS (ESP. FMS) TO ENSURE AUTONOMOUS FLIGHT TRAJECTORY MANAGEMENT?
- HOW CAN AIR TRAFFIC COMPLEXITY FOR AIRBORNE SELF SEPARATION BE DEFINED?
- WHICH INFORMATION MUST BE PROVIDED TO THE AIRCREW TO ENSURE HIGH SITUATION AWARENESS?
- HOW MANY CR ADVISORIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE PILOT?
- HOW SHOULD THE ASAS-TCAS INTERFACE BE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF CR ADVISORIES?
- HOW SHOULD PAZ FOR AIRBORNE SELF SEPARATION BE DEFINED ?
- WHAT BENEFITS WOULD REDUCED SEPARATION STANDARDS BRING?

- **iFLY Progress to Date**
 - Completed first phase of (A3) design cycle and state-of-the-art research.
- **Submitted Deliverables**
 - WP1.1: Autonomous Aircraft Advanced (A3) High Level ConOps
 - WP2.1: Description of airborne human responsibilities in autonomous aircraft operations
 - WP3.1: Complexity metrics applicable to autonomous aircraft
 - WP4.1: Hybrid models and critical observer synthesis for multi-agent situation awareness
 - WP5.1: Comparative Study of Conflict Resolution Methods
 - WP7.1: Accident risk and flight efficiency of A3 operation - Scoping and safety target -
- **Upcoming Meeting**
 - 2nd PMC: May 28-29, 2008, Tartu, Estonia

Web site: <http://iFLY.nlr.nl>
Coordinator: Henk Blom (NLR)

